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Abstract
Much has been written on the increasing significance of domestic courts in the 
international realm. However, the role of the Turkish constitutional judges in deter-
mining and orienting the relationship between international law and Turkish do-
mestic law has rarely been subject to legal analysis. Literature on the involvement 
of the Turkish judges in transnational judicial dialogue is also almost non-existent. 
As far as the existing Turkish literature is concerned, much of the contemporary 
writing on the subject tends to focus on the hierarchical position of internation-
al agreements in the Turkish legal order. This paper intends to fill an important 
gap in the scholarship by providing an analysis of the decisions of the Turkish 
Constitutional Court (TCC) and by illuminating the TCC’s role as implementers or 
non-implementers of international law, and the scope of their participation in tran-
snational judicial dialogue. Relevant sub-questions concern the extent to which the 
stance of the TCC’s judges may or may not alleviate concerns of the international 
community on the rule of law in Turkey, and whether their engagement in interna-
tional law is substantial enough to limit and moderate the excesses of different po-
litical forces, including those in power, engaged in the domestic power struggle. 
Keywords: judicial dialogue; the Turkish Constitutional Court; rule of law; in-
ternational law; foreign law.
1. iNTErNATiONAL ruLE Of LAW, DOMESTiC COurTS AND TrANSNATiONAL 
JuDiCiAL DiALOguE: ThE CASE Of ThE TurKiSh CONSTiTuTiONAL COurT
International legal obligations of States are increasingly becoming “inward-
looking” in that they are more often expected to produce effects within the domes-
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tic legal orders of States.1 More and more domains traditionally belonging to the 
domestic realm are regulated by multilateral institutions and regimes. There is also 
a growing penetration of international human rights law into domestic law. In this 
context, domestic courts are naturally turning into important players at the intersec-
tion of international law with domestic legal orders as they become confronted with 
international law in a variety of domestic legal settings. This, in turn, leads to more 
engagement between international law and domestic courts, as well as increased 
interaction between courts of different orders belonging to different national/inter-
national legal orders.
There is an emerging body of literature on the increasing role and importance 
of domestic judges in determining and orienting relationships between internation-
al law and domestic law through constructing dialogues and conversations between 
national constitutional judges and their international peers based on the principle of 
reciprocal influencing.2 Studies on judicial dialogue are all explicitly or implicitly 
part of a larger and more substantial debate, that on the possibility of an interna-
tional rule of law and on the role domestic courts can play in the advancement of 
this objective. Several scholars have attempted to provide a general framework for 
analysing mutual relationships between national courts and international courts in 
order to identify the consequences of their cooperation – or lack thereof – for the 
advancement of an international rule of law and normative development of inter-
national law. 
The focus on the international rule of law as the main goal of international 
law, and the increasing entanglement of domestic legal orders with international 
law, creates expectations and assumptions as to the decisions of domestic courts. If 
one can assume that the international rule of law is an objective shared both by the 
international community and its State constituencies, then a convergence between 
domestic courts’ general attitude toward and respect for international law is a rea-
sonable expectation. A familiarity among domestic courts about the position and 
decisions of their foreign peers towards an international rule of law can then also be 
assumed. Consciousness of a shared objective – the international rule of law – sets 
a foundation for solidarity among domestic courts in reaching that objective. 
The scholarship on judicial dialogue has become more substantial in content 
and scope over the last two decades. However, it still suffers from important gaps. 
First, the term “judicial dialogue” is used to describe different situations, lending 
some ambiguity to this terminology. Judicial dialogue can be relevant to describe 
1 TzANAKOpOuLOS, Final Report of the Study Group on Principles on the Engagement of 
Domestic Courts with the International Law, International Law Association, 2016.
2 See, i.e. NOLLKAEMpEr, National Courts and the International Rule of Law, Oxford, 2011; 
ShELTON (ed.), International Law and Domestic Legal Systems: Incorporation, Transformation 
and Persuasion, Oxford, 2011; hALJAN, Separating Powers: International Law before National 
Courts, TMC Asser Press, 2013; and DELMAS-MArTy, Les forces imaginantes du droit: La re-
fondation des pouvoirs, Paris, 2007.
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when judges “use international materials to interpret the Constitution”;3 or, when 
domestic courts use “opinions of foreign courts […] to assist in articulating rules 
and decisions in their own domestic cases”;4 and even leading to “the emergence of 
a global jurisprudence, especially in the area of human rights”.5 Judicial dialogue 
can also refer to informal dialogue6 between representatives of international and 
domestic judiciaries. 
This type of judicial dialogue can take different forms. Slaughter elaborates on 
three types of transjudicial conversation: horizontal, vertical, and mixed. Horizontal 
dialogue refers to transjudicial communication between courts of the same status. 
Horizontal dialogue takes place when the Turkish Constitutional Court refers, for 
example, to the decisions of the French Constitutional Court, or the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights refers to decisions of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). Vertical dialogue describes transjudicial communication between na-
tional and supranational courts. The decisions of the European Court of Justice or 
ECtHR are the basis of such vertical judicial dialogue. Mixed dialogue, or mixed 
vertical-horizontal communication occurs, for example, when supranational courts 
initiate horizontal communication among national courts.7
Another visible shortcoming is that the literature is limited to a handful of States 
and regions. Judicial dialogue between European supranational courts and national 
courts and among European constitutional courts is well covered.8 Recent studies 
have also taken into account certain practices of regional courts beyond Europe, 
3 bODANSKy, “The Use of International Sources in Constitutional Opinion”, Georgia Journal 
of International & Comparative Law, 2004, p. 421 ff.
4 hALJAN, cit. supra note 2, p. 2.
5 LAMbErT and gOODWiN-giLL, The Limits of Transnational Law: Refugee Law, Policy 
Harmonization and Judicial Dialogue in the European Union, Cambridge, 2010, p. 2.
6 National and international judges frequently come together at different annual meetings, 
conferences or workshops. To mark the opening of the judicial year, the European Court of 
Human Rights regularly organises seminars where judges from the ECHR and other national 
and international courts exchange and interact around different themes. There are also different 
networks bringing together judges from different jurisdictions such as the International Hague 
Network of Judges.
7 SLAughTEr, “A Typology of Transjudicial Communication”, University of Richmond Law 
Review, 1994, p. 99 ff., pp. 99-100, 112-113.
8 Decaux sees the phenomenon of judicial dialogue as intrinsically related to and derived 
from constant interactions between national courts in Europe and the European supranational 
courts inter alia the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. He 
argues that “there is no longer a ‘sovereign jurisdiction’ that has the last word, because other 
judges are able to judge the judges, whether in Luxembourg or Strasbourg. This remarkable de-
velopment, which creates a permanent interaction between national and European tribunals, has 
been systematized in doctrine, both in the area of judicial practice with the notion of a ‘dialogue 
of judges’ – coined as a median term between a government of judges and a war of judges”. 
DECAux, “France”, in ShELTON (ed.), cit. supra note 2, p. 207 ff., p. 210.
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such as MERCOSUR9 or the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR).10 
However, there is a paucity of works analysing the participation – or lack thereof 
– of other countries and regions in judicial dialogue. Only a few works appear to 
deal with this topic.11
This article focuses on Turkey, which to a large extent has also remained out-
side the scope of the literature on judicial dialogue. It is a largely unappreciated fact 
in European politics that Turkey is firmly rooted in the European public order, and 
has been so for many decades. In this context it is strange that the Turkish courts’ 
practice of judicial dialogue has drawn little attention until now. Furthermore, the 
ignorance is mutual: Turkish scholarship has also paid no attention to judicial dia-
logue. 
Moreover, with particular regard to the Turkish case, while there is a wealth 
of scholarly works on the conundrums of the relationship between the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and Turkey12, a more in-depth legal scrutiny of 
the involvement of the Turkish Constitutional Court (TCC) in judicial dialogue is 
lacking. In a rare contribution to the literature, Esin Örücü tackles the issue from 
the perspective of “judicial comparativism” in human rights cases (albeit in the 
context of the European Convention on Human Rights – ECHR). However, she 
does not address the issue of the TCC’s integration into international law. This pa-
per intends to fill an important gap in the legal scholarship by providing an analysis 
of the decisions of the TCC. In this vein, this paper attempts to illuminate the role 
of the Turkish constitutional judges as implementers or non-implementers of inter-
national law, and the scope of their participation in international judicial dialogue. 
9 ALMEiDA, “The Challenges of the Judicial Dialogue in Mercosur”, The Law & Practice of 
International Courts and Tribunals, 2015, p. 392 ff.
10 AyALA, “The Judicial Dialogue between International and National Courts in the 
Inter-American Human Rights System”, in SChEiNiN, KruNKE and AKSENOVA (eds.), Judges 
as Guardians of Constitutionalism and Human Rights, Chelthenham, 2016, p. 306 ff.; and 
ANSuATEgui rOig, “Human Rights and Judicial Dialogue between American and Europe: 
Toward a New Model of Law”, The Age of Human Rights Journal, 2016, p. 24 ff.
11 In a recent study, Law investigates the judicial comparativism in relation to four lead-
ing courts in East Asia, namely the Japanese Supreme Court, the Korean Constitutional Court, 
the Taiwanese Constitutional Court, and the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal. LAW, “Judicial 
Comparativism and Judicial Diplomacy”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2015, p. 927 
ff.
12 ÖzbuDuN and TürKMEN, “Impact of the ECtHR Rulings on Turkey’s Democratization: An 
Evaluation”, Human Rights Quarterly, 2013, p. 985 ff.; SMiTh, “Leveraging Norms: The ECHR 
and Turkey’s Human Rights Reforms”, in ArAT (ed.), Human Rights in Turkey, University of 
Pennsylvania, 2007, p. 262 ff.; TürMEN, “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi’nin İç Hukukumuza 
Etkileri” (The Impact of the ECHR on Our Domestic Law), Opening Remarks at the 38th 
Anniversary of the Foundation of the Constitutional Court, 2000; and ESEN “How Influential Are 
the Standards of the European Court of Human Rights on the Turkish Constitutional System in 
Banning Political Parties?”, Ankara Law Review, 2012, p. 135 ff.
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2. METhODOLOgy AND SCOpE
This paper strives to shed some light on the degree of engagement of the TCC 
in transnational judicial dialogue by building on a content analysis of its judicial 
decisions. Although the different circumstances to which the term “judicial dia-
logue” may apply can cause some ambiguity, for the purposes of this article it de-
scribes the practice of referring to the decisional law of international and foreign 
courts.13 In particular, the article focuses on the presence and frequency of external 
citations14 in the jurisprudence of the TCC to identify and evaluate its involvement 
in transjudicial dialogue. Earlier works on domestic and international courts fol-
lowed the same method of analysing the presence of external citations in judicial 
decisions.15 Such focus on judicial citations may in fact highlight the depth of in-
volvement of courts with judicial dialogue as well as offer clues about orientations 
and milestones that courts fix for them when choosing to cite decisions of particular 
courts.
A special focus on the TCC can be explained first from a domestic perspective. 
The TCC has recently come into spotlight due to its dealings with many controver-
sial acts of the Turkish Government as well as politically contentious topics. From 
time to time, the Turkish constitutional judges’ decisions represent bold steps to-
wards implementing international norms of the rule of law in the context of an im-
perfect democracy.16 However, the practice of TCC is usually motivated by a pro-
tection of domestic interests or national values at the expense of the international 
13 States are unavoidably bound by international law, whereas the practice of compara-
tive foreign law is purely voluntary. See hirSChL, Comparative Matters: The Renaissance of 
Comparative Constitutional Law, Oxford, 2014, p. 75; JACKSON, Constitutional Engagement in 
a Transnational Era, Oxford, 2013, p. 169; LAW, “Constitutional Convergence and Comparative 
Competency: A Reply to Professors Jackson and Krotoszynski”, Alabama Law Review, 2014, 
p. 145 ff. Bobek also distinguishes between mandatory, advisable and voluntary uses of foreign 
and international law by domestic Supreme courts in Europe. This can be seen as a slightly dif-
ferent categorisation of vertical and horizontal judicial dialogue. See bObEK, The Comparative 
Reasoning in European Supreme Courts, Oxford, 2013, pp. 19-35.
14 Here a distinction must be drawn between judicial usage and judicial citation by borrow-
ing from David Law that “citation of foreign law is a narrow phenomenon that can be measured 
simply by reading judicial opinions. Usage of foreign law is a broader phenomenon that can be 
much harder to observe. Perhaps because citation is so easily observed and quantified, it is tempt-
ing to conflate citation and usage, or to treat citation as a convenient proxy for usage. However, 
the two are not the same, and neither is a satisfactory proxy for the other, for several reasons”. 
LAW, cit. supra note 11, p. 946.
15 VOETEN, “Borrowing and Non-Borrowing among International Courts”, The Journal 
of Legal Studies, 2010, pp. 547-576; and LAW and ChANg, “The Limits of Global Judicial 
Dialogue”, 86 Washington Law Review, 2011, pp. 523-577. 
16 In 2014, the TCC overturned the Turkish Telecommunications Communication Presidency’s 
decisions on banning Twitter and YouTube. The Court has received two separate individual ap-
plications. See the Turkish Constitutional Court (Turkey), Twitter Decision, App No: 2014/3986 
of 2 April 2014, and YouTube Decision, App No: 2014/4705 of 29 May 2014.
46 FOCUS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN REGIONAL AND DOMESTIC SYSTEMS
rule of law. This posture of the Court merits special attention, as public institutions 
in Turkey have been experiencing a significant crisis in legitimacy in recent years. 
Second, reason for focusing only on the TCC is driven by the broader literature 
on judicial dialogue. Literature on the judicial dialogue covering the experiences 
of domestic courts is most often focused on the practice of constitutional courts. 
Accordingly, this paper aims to contribute to the literature by bringing the TCC’s 
experience to light.17 
According to Article 148 of the 1982 Turkish Constitution and Article 3 of the 
Turkish Law No. 6216, the TCC has the following competencies: (i) constitutional 
review of legislative acts; (ii) dissolution and/or financial control of political par-
ties; (iii) the capacity of Supreme Criminal Tribunal; (iv) control of parliamen-
tary immunity and deprivation of the status of MP; and (v) individual applications 
(since September 2012).
This paper examines the constitutionality review and the dissolution of party 
closure cases, as these decisions constitute the bulk of constitutional litigation in 
Turkey. Within this framework, the TCC’s database contains more than 3,000 de-
cisions. The time frame for cases reviewed for this analysis is between 1999 and 
2012. 1999 corresponds roughly to two important dates with respect to Turkey’s 
position in the European order. The fundamental reason for choosing this time 
frame is that, until the entry in force of Protocol No. 11 to the ECHR on November 
1998, which established a full-time single Court replacing the Convention’s former 
monitoring machinery,18 the TCC was reluctant to engage in international law or 
foreign judicial precedents in other jurisdictions.19 Another factor is that near the 
end of 1998, Turkey had made significant progress in the EU negotiation process, 
eventually being granted official candidate status at the Helsinki Summit on 11 
December 1999.
Turkey launched a mechanism of individual applications to the TCC in 
September 2012. However, because the individual application process is indexed 
on the ECHR,20 focusing on them will not present a complete picture of engage-
17 LAMbErT and gOODWiN-giLL, cit. supra note 5: SChEiNiN, KruNKE and AKSENOVA, cit. 
supra note 10.
18 Turkey signed the Protocol on 11 May 1994 and ratified it on 22 May 1997. The Turkish 
Law No. 4255 ‘İnsan Haklarını ve Ana Hürriyetleri Korumaya Dair Sözleşmenin Oluşturduğu 
Denetim Mekanizmasının Yeniden Yapılanmasına İlişkin 11 No.lu Protokolün Onaylanmasının 
Uygun Bulunduğu Hakkında Kanun’ of 14 May 1997, available at: <https://www.tbmm.gov.
tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc080/kanuntbmmc080/kanuntbm-
mc08004255.pdf >.
19 ÖrüCü, “Ulusal Anayasa Mahkemelerinde ‘Yargısal Karşılaştırmacılık’ ve Mahkemeler 
Arası Diyalog” (Judicial Comparativism in National Constitutional Courts), 24 Anayasa Yargısı, 
2007, p. 433 ff., p. 441.
20 Article 148/3 of the Turkish Constitution, as revised in 2010, states that “everyone may 
apply to the Constitutional Court on the grounds that one of the fundamental rights and freedoms 
within the scope of the European Convention on Human Rights which are guaranteed by the 
Constitution has been violated by public authorities […]”. In light of this provision, the TCC 
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ment by the TCC’s judges with international law. Therefore the database of the 
Court is screened for decisions rendered until 2012 and the decisions concerning 
individual applications are expressly left out of the scope.
For the party closure cases, a different time frame was chosen. Since its incep-
tion in 1962, a total of 134 applications seeking to dissolve political parties have 
been made to the TCC by the Office of the Chief Public Prosecutor of the High Court 
of Appeals of Turkey (Yargıtay Başsavcılığı). Only 6 of them occurred under the 
1961 Constitution. 128 applications have been made under the 1982 Constitution. 
From 1982 to 2016, the TCC examined a total of 41 cases, through which the Court 
dissolved 20 political parties. 21 The majority of these cases concerned political par-
ties deemed to pose serious threats to the Turkish constitutional order, being either 
politically left and/or committed to political Islam and/or committed to separatist 
Kurdish nationalism.22
3. iNTErNATiONAL LAW AND ThE TurKiSh CONSTiTuTiONAL OrDEr
3.1. The TCC in the Turkish Political System
Although Turkey introduced the Constitutional Court as the highest jurisdic-
tion in its constitutional system for the first time in the 1961 Constitution, 23 it was 
already clear that the TCC was going to be a powerful court when it began hearing 
cases in 1962. Its strength and strategic position stem from its design and from the 
purpose for which it was created and later co-opted by influential players of Turkish 
politics, to maintain balance between different forces in domestic politics.24 For 
accepts individual applications only when a human rights norm, which is allegedly violated by 
State, is covered both by the Turkish Constitution and the ECHR. If a human rights norm is 
covered only by one of the two, the Court will reject the application. See TCC, Onurhan Solmaz 
Decision, App No:2012/1049 of 26 March 2013.
21 From 1991 to date, the TCC has dissolved Halk Partisi (1991), Türkiye Birleşik Komünist 
Partisi (1991), Sosyalist Parti (1992), Büyük Anadolu Partisi (1992), Sosyalist Türkiye Partisi 
(1993), Halkın Emek Partisi (1993), Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Partisi (1993), Demokrasi Partisi 
(1994), Demokrat Parti (1994), Sosyalist Birlik Partisi (1994), Yeşiller Partisi (1994), Diriliş 
Partisi (1996), Demokrasi ve Değişim Partisi (1996), Emek Partisi (1997), Demokratik Kitle 
Partisi (1999), Fazilet Partisi (2001), Halkın Demokrasi Partisi (2003), Hak ve Özgürlükler 
Partisi (2008), Adalet Partisi (2009), and Demokratik Toplum Partisi (2009). 
22 bâLi, “Courts and Constitutional Transition: Lessons from the Turkish Case”, International 
Journal of Constitutional Law, 2013, p. 666 ff., pp. 666-701.
23 zürChEr, Turkey: A Modern History, 2004, pp. 221-240.
24 ÖzbuDuN and gENçKAyA, Democratization and the Politics of Constitution-Making in 
Turkey, 2009, pp. 14-19.
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these purposes, the TCC was vested with excessive powers and far-reaching com-
petences, however, with significant differences in nature.25
The 1961 Constitution introduced a liberal framework for the protection of 
civil rights. Obviously, the TCC was expected to be the guardian of this liberal 
framework, using its independence and powers to accomplish this. However, the 
role played by the TCC in Turkish politics turned out to be completely different 
from its formal calling as guardian of liberal values.
This early transformation of the TCC into a guardian of political regimes re-
sulted from the entanglement of two factors. First, new regimes, which came to 
power after the 1960 and 1980 coups, deliberately avoided weakening the status 
of the TCC. Instead, they sought to co-opt the TCC to strengthen their grip over 
Turkish politics and society. When a new constitution was adopted in 1982 fol-
lowing the coup of 1980, the drafter of the 1982 Constitution “did little to alter the 
powers of the TCC save clarifying a limitation on the powers of judicial review and 
modifying the appointments procedure to afford the executive together with the 
military a larger role in selecting justices”.26
The second factor leading to the TCC developing the role of guardian of the 
regime was the elevation of particular powers of the Court at the expense of others. 
Constitutional scholars identified five functions of constitutional courts in contem-
porary politics: (i) the veto-force; (ii) the guardian; (iii) the public-reasoner; (iv) the 
institutional interlocutor; and (v) the deliberator.27 These are not necessarily mutu-
ally exclusive, and some may prevail over others. In the case of the TCC, justices 
most often used their powers as veto-force and as guardian. A study analysing the 
practice of the TCC found that between 1962 and 1999 the Court used its veto pow-
ers to strike down more than half of the statutes referred to it.28 
The TCC has developed an image as guardian of a particular ideological re-
gime, described as “elite hegemonic preservation through juristocracy”.29 More 
specifically, these powers were exercised in the service of a very particular inter-
pretation of the Constitution as written, as well as the political foundation and ide-
ology of the Turkish Republic known as Kemalism. The Court has thus redefined 
itself into a mechanism to guard the Republic’s fundamental values and principles, 
25 Constitutional review is a very different judicial function from that of political party clo-
sures. As aptly put by Köker, party closure is not a function of “judicial review”, but bears more 
of a resemblance to criminal law procedure. KÖKEr, “Turkey’s Political-Constitutional Crisis: 
An Assessment of the Role of the Constitutional Court”, 17.2 Constellations, 2010, p. 328 ff., 
p. 336.
26 bâLi, cit. supra note 22, p. 670.
27 MENDES, Constitutional Courts and Deliberative Democracy, Oxford, 2013, pp. 1-4.
28 bELgE, “Friends of the Court: The Republican Alliance and Selective Activism of the 
Constitutional Court of Turkey”, Law & Society Review, 2006, p. 653 ff., p. 654.
29 hirSChL, “The Political Origins of the New Constitutionalism”, Indiana Journal of Global 
Legal Studies, 2004, p. 71 ff., p. 103.
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and has reserved its support “to protect some groups and values while suppressing 
the demands of others”.30
The TCC’s role as the guardian of Kemalist ideology has been largely report-
ed and analysed in the literature, especially among political scientists and legal 
scholars.31 This image of the Court prevailed until recent years, when the Kemalist 
political establishment was effectively challenged by the AKP Government. The 
Kemalist establishment tried to use the TCC to resist political reforms from the 
early 2000s. The TCC was an effective instrument to resist change precisely due to 
its judicial independence and veto powers.32 The TCC emerged as a “tutor” institu-
tion, aligned with the interests of the military-state elites and aimed at limiting the 
actions of a pluralistic democracy, particularly through its docket of political party 
closure cases. In doing so, the TCC has always played a key role in preserving the 
strictly secular and nationalist nature of Turkey’s political context by repeatedly 
outlawing political parties either based on alleged threats to national unity or based 
on alleged anti-secular activities.
3.2. The Structural Ambiguity Concerning the Status of International Law in the 
Turkish Constitutional Order
Approaches to the study of international/domestic law topics in the Turkish 
literature33 since the adoption of a new Constitution in 1982 have evolved pri-
30 Shambayati also proposes a slightly different explanation for transformation of the TCC 
into the guardian of the regime. To him, countries like Turkey and Iran used modern constitutions 
to create new nations under new political regimes. Constitutions adopted by Turkey and Iran in 
the 20th century were thus ideological constitutions which were opposed by powerful actors 
and large segments of populations. This opposition to social engineering efforts engineered by 
political elites led to the emergence of guardian institutions: “the civilizing mission of the state in 
Turkey has led to the creation of a regime with guardians where elected and unelected institutions 
jointly exercise power. The presence of guardians requires the creation of institutions such as 
constitutional courts that serve to preserve the above politics posture of the guardians by putting 
a distance between them and day-to-day politics. What distinguishes these institutions from their 
counterparts in consolidated democracies is that despite their political importance they are iso-
lated from elected institutions and their primary role is to protect the ideological dominance of 
the guardians”. ShAMbAyATi, “The Guardian of the Regime: The Turkish Constitutional Court in 
Comparative Perspective”, in ArJOMAND (ed.), Constitutional Politics in the Middle East: With 
Special Reference to Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan, Farnham, 2008, pp. 99-121.
31 See bâLi, “The Perils of Judicial Independence: Constitutional Transition and the Turkish 
Example”, Virginia Journal of International Law, 2011, pp. 235-320; bELgE, cit. supra note 28, 
p. 656; and ShAMbAyATi cit. supra note 30, p. 106.
32 bâLi, cit. supra note 22, pp. 667-673.
33 güNDüz, “Eroding Concept of National Sovereignty: The Turkish Example”, Marmara 
Journal of European Studies, 1991, p. 99 ff.; Başlar, “Uluslararası Antlaşmaların Onaylanması, 
Üstünlüğü ve Anayasal Denetimi Üzerine” (On Ratification, Primacy and Constitutional Control 
of International Agreements), 24/1-2 Milletlerarası Hukuk ve Milletlerarası Özel Hukuku 
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marily around three questions: (1) How are international agreements transposed 
into Turkish law? (2) What is the hierarchical position of international law in the 
Turkish domestic legal setting? (3) Should international treaties be submitted to 
constitutional review?
The Turkish Constitution, unlike others (e.g., the German Constitution), does 
not contain a general reference to international law including international custom-
ary law. It is therefore Article 90(5) of the Turkish Constitution which addresses the 
normative status of international agreements which is the starting point to inves-
tigate the status of international law in Turkey’s legal order: “International agree-
ments duly put into effect have the force of law. No appeal to the Constitutional 
Court shall be made with regard to these agreements, on the grounds that they are 
unconstitutional”.
The formulation of Article 90(5), however, generated controversy regarding 
the supremacy of international law in the era of the 1982 Constitution. Some schol-
ars argued that international treaties have the same effect as domestic law; there-
fore, the provision was not a manifest recognition of the supremacy of international 
law. Accordingly, in case of a conflict between a domestic law and an international 
treaty, which might result in the State’s responsibility, the principles of lex posteri-
ori and lex specialis were to apply. Unless expressly mentioned in the Constitution, 
an international norm cannot prevail over domestic law.34 Others have countered 
this argument by focusing on the fact that no appeal can be made with regard to 
an international agreement on the basis of the unconstitutionality thereof. Even 
though these scholars agreed that the Constitution did not explicitly recognise the 
Bülteni: Prof. Dr. Sevin Tolner’e Armağan, 2004, p. 279 ff.; Başlar, “Yeni Sivil Anayasada 
Uluslararası Hukuka İlişkin Hükümler” (Provisions Regarding International Law in the New 
Civilian Constitution), in gÖzTEpE and çELEbiL (eds.), Demokratik Anayasa: Görüşler ve 
Öneriler (Democratic Constitution: Opinions and Recommendations), Metis Yayınları, 2012, p. 
339 ff.; AKipEK, “Türk mevzuatının onaylanan uluslararası antlaşmalar ile uyumlaştırılması soru-
nu” (Problem of Harmonization of Turkish Legislation with Ratified International Agreements), 
48/1-4 Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, 1999, p. 15 ff.; AybAy, “Uluslararası 
Antlaşmaların Türk Hukukundaki Yeri” (The Place of International Treaties in the Turkish 
Legal Order), Türkiye Barolar Birliği Dergisi, 2007, p. 187 ff.; CAN, “Türk Hukuk Düzeninin 
Milletlerarası Hukuka Açıklığı” (The Openness of Turkish Legal Order to International Law), 
Yasama Dergisi, 2009, p. 5 ff.; pAzArCi, “Türk Hukukunda Andlaşmalar ile Yasaların Çatışması” 
(The Conflict between Turkish Domestic Law and International Treaties), 24/1-2 Milletlerarası 
Hukuk ve Milletlerarası Özel Hukuku Bülteni: Prof. Dr. Sevin Tolner’e Armağan, 2004, p. 651 
ff.; SOySAL, “Uluslararası Andlaşmalar Konusunda Anayasa Yargısı” (Constitutional Review 
on International Treaties), Anayasa Yargısı Dergisi, 1997, p. 171 ff.; TuNç, “Milletlerarası 
Sözleşmelerin Türk İç Hukukuna Etkisi” (The Impact of International Treaties on Turkish 
Domestic Law), Anayasa Dergisi, 2000, p. 174 ff.
34 gÖzLEr, “İnsan Hakları Normlarının Anayaüstülüğü Sorunu” (The Question of the Supra-
Constitutionality of Human Rights Norms), in çiTçi (ed.), Türkiye’de İnsan Hakları (Human 
Rights in Turkey), Ankara, 2000, p. 25 ff., p. 39; pAzArCi, cit. supra note 33, p. 660; ÖzbuDuN 
and yAziCi, Democratization Reforms in Turkey (1993-2004), Ankara, 2004, p. 12; and pAzArCi, 
Uluslararasi Hukuk Dersleri (International Law Lectures), Vol. 1, Ankara, 2001, p. 32.
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supremacy of international law, as they further argued, at least it accorded a pro-
tection to international treaties in the Turkish domestic legal order. In this manner, 
the general principles of lex posteriori and lex specialis would not be sufficient to 
disregard international treaties, as such treaties can be regarded as the embodiment 
of “a common will of states”35 or, even more, “common cultural heritage”36.
In 2004, Article 90 was amended to clarify a protracted concern over the nor-
mative status of the international agreements duly put into effect. The 2004 amend-
ment gave preferential treatment to human rights treaties, stipulating that in the 
case of a conflict between international human right treaties duly put into effect and 
domestic law, international agreements take precedence over domestic law.37 
This considerable degree of ambiguity persists even after the 2004 amendment, 
which has also been used equally by the proponents of the supremacy of interna-
tional law in the Turkish legal order as much as by those who affirm the primacy 
of the Turkish domestic law. For proponents of dualism, a conflict between interna-
tional law norms and constitutional norms is almost impossible.38 If such a conflict 
occurs, the TCC must ignore international law and enforce the Constitution.39 As 
for the proponents of a monist approach and thus, the supremacy of international 
law, the TCC must consider international law as forming part of a “constitutional-
ity block” or reference norms when adjudicating.40 If there is a conflict between 
35 Eroğlu, Devletler Umumi Hukuku (Public International Law), Ankara:Turhan Kitabevi, 
1984, 3rd ed., p. 32.
36 bATuM, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi ve Türk Anayasal Sistemine Etkileri (The 
European Convention on Human Rights and its Impact on the Turkish Constitutional System), 
İstanbul Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1993, p. 261.
37 “(Sentence added on May 7, 2004; Act No. 5170) In the case of a conflict between interna-
tional agreements, duly put into effect, concerning fundamental rights and freedoms and the laws 
due to differences in provisions on the same matter, the provisions of international agreements 
shall prevail”.
38 For a strong argument in favour of dualism in Turkish legal system, see gÖzLEr, “The 
Question of the Rank of International Treaties in National Hierarchy of Norms: A Theoretical and 
Comparative Study”, in rEçbEr, ÖzDAL and ÖzgENç (eds.), Prof. Dr. Mehmet Genç’e Armağan 
(Essays in Honor of Prof. Dr. Mehmet Genç), Bursa, Dora, 2016, pp. 21-46. For useful overview 
of different approaches in the monism-dualism debate as well as discussion on hierarchical rela-
tions between international law and Turkish law see güNDüz, cit. supra note 33; pAzArCi, cit. 
supra note 33; şahBaz, “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi’nin Türk Yargı Sistemindeki Yeri” 
(The Place of the European Convention on Human Rights in the Turkish Juridical System), 54 
Türkiye Barolar Birliği Dergisi, 2004, pp. 178-216.
39 gÖzLEr, cit. supra note 34, p. 39.
40 The term “constitutionality block” was first introduced to the Turkish context by 
yuzbASiOgLu, “Turk Anayasa Yargisinda Anayasallik Bloku” (Constitutionality Block in 
Turkish Constitutional Jurisprudence), Istanbul, 1993. For a critical overview of the “constitu-
tionality block” approach, see gÖzLEr, “Türk Anayasa Yargısında Anayasallık Bloğu Kavramına 
İhtiyaç Var mıdır?” (Is There a Need for the Concept of ‘Bloc of Constitutionality’ in the Turkish 
Constitutional Justice?), 56.3 Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, 2000, pp. 
81-103.
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conventional norms and domestic norms, the Court must enforce the international 
norm and ignore the conflicting domestic rule, without hesitation. 
The TCC’s case law, however, does not provide clarity for this ambiguity. A 
closer look at its jurisprudence shows that the Court adopts a pragmatic approach 
exemplified by divergent opinions. A salient example can be found in its 1997 ruling 
in which the Court had to review the constitutionality of “Law No. 4163 approv-
ing the ratification of the Agreement of the Islamic Corporation for the Insurance 
of Investment and Export Credit (ICIEC)”.41 The TCC first confirmed that Article 
90 “intended to leave international agreements outside the scope of constitutional 
review. Hence, independently from treaty, claims against laws approving ratifica-
tion can be brought before the Constitutional Court”.42 More importantly, the Court 
underlined that international treaties cannot be attributed supranational or supra-
constitutional status in the Turkish legal order:
“Despite the fact that some countries recognize treaties as suprana-
tional and even supra-constitutional norms and the doctrine supports 
this opinion, it is impossible to draw similar conclusion from the arti-
cle 90 of the Constitution. [...] From the perspective of domestic law; 
in case of conflict between treaties and laws and if it is impossible to 
remove it by way of interpretation, solution is taken on the basis of 
rules applied to conflict between two domestic laws”.43
On the other hand, several decisions of the TCC can be read as a tacit confir-
mation of the supremacy of international law. The TCC recognises that specific 
international treaties may hold the utmost importance and a privileged position 
in the Turkish legal order. For example, the Court has held that “imperative and 
binding content of the declaration (Universal Declaration of Human Rights) and 
the agreement (European Convention of Human Rights) in question, which is right 
for defendants, also carries characteristic of supreme and universal legal rule and 
as such strengthens the principle of presumption of innocence which has solid base 
in our legal order as guarantee of human rights and freedoms”.44 In another deci-
41 Article 90(4) expressly prevents claims on the basis of unconstitutionality of international 
treaties. However, the TCC reserves the right to control conformity of international agreements 
with the Constitution indirectly by reviewing not the agreement per se but the law approving its 
ratification.
42 The Constitutional Court (Turkey), Esas No. 1996/55, Karar No. 1997/33 (Resmi Gazete 
24 March 2001). All translations from Turkish are by the authors.
43 Ibid.
44 The Constitutional Court (Turkey), Esas No. 1979/38, Karar No. 1980/11 (Resmi Gazete 
15 May 1980).
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sion, the Court ruled that “treaties that eliminated all forms discrimination between 
children could be qualified as supra-constitutional norms”.45
The TCC thus sends contradictory signals about its attitude toward interna-
tional law. It neither sides completely with the sovereignty approach, nor does it 
fundamentally adhere to the supremacy of international law. In doing so, it protects 
and strengthens its own position as a strong political actor carrying power to arbiter 
not only between domestic constituencies, but also between Turkish law and the 
international legal system. 
In sum, the reception and hierarchical position of international agreements in 
the Turkish domestic legal system has always been controversial. Even more con-
troversial has been the extent to which international law is applied and/or imple-
mented by the Turkish domestic courts.
4. ENgAgiNg WiTh ThE TCC frOM ThE pErSpECTiVE Of JuDiCiAL DiALOguE
The present part of the article evaluates the TCC’s involvement with transna-
tional judicial dialogue. In doing so, it focuses on patterns of external citations in 
the jurisprudence of the Court. The analysis also includes both vertical and hori-
zontal judicial dialogue in order to identify the level of the TCC’s dialogue with 
international and foreign courts. 
Table 1: International Law in the constitutionality review cases of the TCC. ‘/’ separates two 
periods (1999-2005 and 2006-2012).
45 The Constitutional Court (Turkey), Esas No. 1990/18, Karar No. 1991/5 (Resmi Gazete 
27 March 1992).
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Table 2: International Law in the political party closure decisions of the TCC. ‘/’ separates two 
periods (1982-2005 and 2006-2012).
4.1. Level of International Law in the Decisions of the TCC: Internationalisation 
or Europeanisation?
The actual percentage of constitutional cases in which the TCC cites inter-
national law is roughly 4-5%.46 However, there has been a perceptible increase 
in frequency in the last 10 years. In the context of the European Union accession 
process, the TCC has started to take heed of international human rights law. From 
a historical point of view, the TCC’s practice in terms of usage of international 
law has been fuelled by the fact that compliance with ECtHR rulings is a proviso 
of Turkey’s EU membership. An increased level of engagement in transnational 
judicial dialogue has thus been intrinsic to the EU accession process. Despite the 
more global dimensions of judicial dialogue in the sense of “internationalisa-
tion” of law, “Europeanisation” has unquestionably driven and shaped much of 
the TCC’s approach to the phenomenon. The TCC has thus become increasingly 
porous to the influence of the European human rights regime. Given that Turkey 
has often had rocky relations with the ECtHR, the Strasbourg court has taken a key 
role in the democratisation process in Turkey and in reforming the country’s legal 
system.47 To some extent, this “dialogue” has been uncontroversial as this marked 
“openness” toward European and international standards has prompted the Court 
to take necessary steps aimed at eliminating grave inconsistencies and incompat-
ibilities in the Turkish legal order. In other words, this is a classic example of what 
Tzanakopoulos has described as the “alignment” strategy that the TCC adopted to 
46 This excludes references to foreign law.
47 See inter alia SMiTh, cit. supra note 12, pp. 262-274.
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align or harmonise domestic legislation with international law. For an example, 
in a 2002 case48 in which the appellate courts sought annulment of Article 38 of 
the Turkish Expropriation Law49 on the basis of its compatibility with the Turkish 
Constitution, the TCC stated that the occupation and use of the land by States con-
stituted a de facto expropriation of property for the purposes of Article 1 Protocol 
No. 1 of the ECHR. In Carbonara and Ventura50 and Belvedere Alberghiera,51 the 
ECtHR stated that the interpretation of the rule on constructive expropriation by 
the Italian courts deprived litigants of effective protection of their rights and thus 
infringed Article 1 Protocol No. 1. In reaching their decision, the TCC followed the 
guidance of the ECtHR in these cases and annulled the aforementioned provision 
of the Turkish Expropriation Law. It is a salient factor that between 1992 and 2003 
more than 350 expropriation cases concerning Turkey came before the ECtHR.52
In a similar vein, in 2010, the Siirt first instance court made an application seek-
ing annulment of Article 4 of the Turkish Surname Act,53 which stated that “in cases 
of annulment of marriage or divorce, the child shall adopt the surname chosen/to be 
chosen by father even if right of custody was given to mother”. The TCC annulled 
the relevant provision finding it contrary to Articles 10 and 41 of the Constitution 
and ruled that issues of gender equality and gender-based discrimination, including 
the right of custody and the exercise of powers related to such right, are included in 
various international legal documents on human rights such as Articles 1 and 2 of 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW), Article 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), and Article 14 of the ECHR and in the case law of the ECtHR, such as 
the Burghartz54 and Ünal Tekeli cases.55
48 The Constitutional Court (Turkey), Esas No. 2002/112, Karar No. 2003/33 (Resmi Gazete 
4 November 2003).
49 Article 38 of the Turkish Expropriation Law (No. 2942 adopted on 4 November 1983, 
published on the Official Gazette of Turkey No. 18215 on 8 November 1983) stated that “in the 
case of immovable property subject to expropriation where the expropriation procedure has not 
ended or of immovable property whose expropriation has not been requested but which has been 
assigned to public-service use or on which buildings intended for public use have been erected, 
all the rights of owners, possessors or their heirs to bring an action relating to that property shall 
lapse after twenty years. Time shall begin to run on the date of the occupation of the property”.
50 Carbonara and Ventura v. Italy, Application No. 24638/94, Judgment of 30 May 2000.
51 Belvedere Alberghiera S.R.L. v. Italy, Application No. 31524/96, Judgment of 30 May 
2000.
52 For a detailed analysis see yOMrALiOgLu, uzuN and NiSANCi, “Land Valuation Issues of 
Expropriation Applications in Turkey”, Vol. 9, FIG Commission, 2007, pp. 80-90.
53 The Turkish Surname Act No 2525 (adopted on 21 Haziran 1934, published in the Official 
Gazette of Turkey on 2 Temmuz 1934) required all Turkish citizens to adopt the use of sur-
names.
54 Burghartz v. Switzerland, Application No. 16213/90, Judgment of 22 February 1994.
55 Tekeli v. Turkey, Application No. 29865/96, Judgment of 16 November 2004.
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What remains controversial, however, is the extent to which Turkish domestic 
judges are, or ought to be, responsible for ensuring the effectiveness of internation-
al law in the Turkish legal system. From a legal standpoint, the 2004 amendment 
granting normative status of international agreements has clarified the situation. At 
least from a theoretical perspective, the aim of the 2004 amendment was to resolve 
the issue by making it clear that international human rights agreements have prec-
edence over domestic laws. 
When assessing the application and implementation of international law by 
Turkish domestic courts, however, the picture is dismal. While the Turkish lower 
courts almost never make use of international law, the trajectory of the TCC’s deci-
sions demonstrates another grave disconnect: the international commitments made 
by the ratification of human rights treaties have remained on paper, but are not 
matched in practice. Although there are a few examples of making use of interna-
tional law in the Turkish legal order – as noted above – the TCC seldom looks at 
international law while exclusively engaging in dialogue with one particular court 
– the ECtHR – as is clear from the tables above. This dialogue is best described 
as a mandatory dialogue as patently evidenced by the TCC’s usage of the ECHR. 
While it is a fact that direct references to the ECHR by the TCC are rare, at the same 
time, they are generally a reference to the most cited (and the least open-ended) 
ECHR articles, such as Articles 2, 3, 6, 8, 10, 11, 17. Interestingly, these articles 
correspond to articles on the basis of which Turkey is frequently challenged and 
convicted by the ECtHR.56 More importantly, the TCC generally quotes provisions 
of the ECHR, but fails to test the case at hand against the criteria developed through 
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Thus, there is a substantial gap between the inter-
national norms and the TCC’s actual practices.57
In this regard, it must be highlighted that the TCC has hitherto appeared friend-
ly to the use of international law but in practice has been generally hostile to it. This 
is particularly due to the fact that the Turkish Constitution adopted by a military 
regime in 1982 enshrines fundamental principles in its Preface and contains “una-
mendable provisions” reflected in Articles 2 and 3, not limited to the rule of law, 
the respect for democracy and human rights, but also some peculiar ones, such as 
the principles of secularism and the indivisible integrity of the State with its terri-
tory and nation. A closer examination of the case law of the TCC shows that these 
so-called peculiar principles form the fundamentum of the Turkish constitutional 
56 See, e.g., the latest report of the ECtHR, which analyses violations of the ECHR by articles 
and by States to observe this overlap between citations of the TCC and decisions of the ECtHR 
regarding Turkey, available at <http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_violation_2016_ENG.
pdf>.
57 On a particular note, the TCC also takes into account whether there are equivalent provi-
sions (or counterparts) in the Turkish domestic law when it cites the ECHR. For example, Article 
6 of the ECHR (as a counterpart to Article 36 of the Turkish Constitution (TC)-hak arama hür-
riyeti), Article 8 of the ECHR (Article 20 of the TC-özel hayatın gizliliği), and Article 1 Protocol 
No. 1 ECHR (Article 35 of the TC-mülkiyet hakkı).
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order and thus cannot be debated or questioned even if it carries potential conflict 
vis-à-vis international standards. According to one author, this may reflect a covert 
presence of Turkish cultural exceptionalism, i.e. the unique official Turkish identity 
that must be upheld above all else, even at the expense of violating Turkey’s inter-
national obligations.58 The TCC, therefore, seems to be particularly reluctant to ap-
ply international law when the case touches upon linguistic, religious, and minority 
rights, and freedoms of expression and association.59 In such cases, the TCC relies 
on domestic law to contest international norms.
4.2. A Paradigmatic Area of Disparity: The Party Closure Cases
The TCC’s reasoning in the dissolution of political party cases is particularly 
illuminating. In these decisions, the representatives of the political parties based 
their arguments on Articles 11 and 17 of the ECHR. Instead, the TCC relied upon 
Article 68(4) of the Turkish Constitution60 and the more draconian list of prohibi-
tions in the Turkish Law on Political Parties61 in deciding whether parties should be 
excluded from the arena of permissible participation on the basis of the principle of 
“the indivisible integrity of the Turkish state with its territory and nation”.
A salient example of the TCC’s narrowing and limiting approach to freedom 
and rights based on its restrictive interpretation of the territorial unity of the State 
can be found in its ruling on the Democracy Party (DP) in 1993. The TCC ruled 
that “the Constitution which is based on the principle of unitary state, does not per-
mit federal state. Therefore, political parties cannot include federal system in their 
program, and cannot advocate such a structure […]. As the principle of nation-state 
does not permit the notion of a multi-national state, there is no room for a federal 
structure in such a system”.62 In the same decision, the TCC defined even “regional 
States” as “discriminatory” by stating that “the Constitution is closed to […] au-
tonomy and self-rule for regions”, even though regionalism is a form of unitary 
58 ÖrüCü, “The Turkish Experience with Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases”, 
in ÖrüCü (ed.), Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases, London, 2003, pp. 131-136.
59 OrAN, “The Minority Concept and Rights in Turkey: The Lausanne Peace Treaty and 
Current Issues”, in ArAT (ed.) Human Rights in Turkey, University of Pennsylvania, 2007, pp. 
35-57.
60 Article 68(4) of the Turkish Constitution: “The bylaws and programmes, as well as the 
activities of political parties shall not be in conflict with the independence of the state, its indivis-
ible integrity with its territory and nation, human rights, the principles of equality and rule of law, 
sovereignty of the nation, the principles of the democratic and secular republic; they shall not 
aim to protect or establish class or group dictatorship or dictatorship of any kind, nor shall they 
incite citizens to crime”.
61 The Turkish Law on Political Parties No. 2820 of 22 April 1983, published in the Official 
Gazette of Turkey on 24 April 1983.
62 The Constitutional Court (Turkey), Esas No. 1993/3, Karar No. 1994/2 (Resmi Gazete 16 
June 1994).
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State. In another ruling on the Socialist Party (SP), the TCC even advanced this pe-
culiar interpretation by stating that international human rights law such as Articles 
11 and 17 of the ECHR, and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR support its restrictive 
interpretation. In the words of the TCC, “there is no doubt that the activities of the 
Socialist Party which were found to be in breach of the Constitution would also 
be in violation of the provisions of the ECtHR”.63 Interestingly, the Court did not 
propose a convincing argument. As one would expect, the ECtHR has consistently 
found a violation of the ECHR in all cases from Turkey including the Democrat 
Party and the Socialist Party cases, except for the Welfare Party case.64
In another ruling on the Democratic Peace Movement Party in 1997, the TCC 
ruled:
“Article 90 says ‘international agreements duly put into effect 
are equal to law’. According to this rule, provisions of European 
Convention of Human Rights have the force of law. But, the Turkish 
Law on Political Parties has priority here due to its character of spe-
cial law. Moreover, the Convention does not include concrete norms 
that could be applied to party closure cases. Due to these considera-
tions, there exists no possibility to directly apply relevant provisions 
of the ECHR by ignoring rules of Political Parties Act in this case”.65
While it is a fact that the TCC’s approach to the dissolution of political parties 
has been on a changing path recently, the Court is better known for its unchanging 
mindset despite numerous European Court judgments. It is only recently that there 
have been some modest efforts, including the constitutional amendment of 2010 
that increased the simple majority to dissolve a political party to a two-thirds vote 
in the TCC.
63 The Constitutional Court (Turkey), Esas No. 1996/1, Karar No. 1997/1 (Resmi Gazete 14 
February 1997).
64 Consider also some of the judgments rendered by the ECtHR on the dissolution of pro-Kurd-
ish political parties: Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey, Application Nos. 20/1997/804/1007, 
Judgment of 25 May 1998; United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, Application 
No. 133/1996/752/951, Judgment of 30 January 1998; Freedom and Democracy Party v. Turkey, 
Application No. 23885/94, Judgment of 8 December 1999; Yazar, The People’s Labour Party 
and Others v. Turkey Application Nos. 22723/93, 22724/93 and 22725/93, Judgment of 9 April 
2002; Dicle for the Democratic Party v. Turkey, Application No. 25141/94, Judgment of 10 
December 2002; Democracy and Change Party and Others v. Turkey, Application Nos. 39210/98 
and 39974/98, Judgment of 26 April 2005; Emek Partisi and Şenol v. Turkey, Application No. 
39434/98, Judgment of 31 May 2005; Demokratik Kitle Partisi and Elçi v. Turkey, Application 
No. 51290/99, Judgment of 3 May 2007; and HADEP and Demir v. Turkey, Application No. 
28003/03, Judgment of 14 December 2010.
65 The Constitutional Court (Turkey), Esas No. 1996/3, Karar No. 1997/3 (Resmi Gazete 2 
June 2000).
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As for the three recent closure cases on the Rights and Freedoms Party (Hak-
Par), the Democratic Society Party (DTP) and the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP), the TCC only dissolved the DTP based on evidence that it had become a 
centre for the execution of activities which violated the State’s indivisible integrity 
of its territory and nation by providing assistance and support to the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK).66 Although it is a modest positive move, the TCC’s approach 
towards international law still continues to be controversial. In these recent cases, 
the judges tended to argue that the conflict in those cases is between the Turkish 
Constitution and international law rather than between domestic law and interna-
tional law. When international law is in conflict with the Constitution, a domestic 
court may be expected to overcome the problem by interpreting the Constitution in 
conformity with international law.67 However, looking at the TCC’s infrequent use 
of international law reveals that the Court consistently gives priority to a strict read-
ing of the Turkish Constitution over international law.68 To illustrate, in its ruling on 
the Hak-Par case in 2008, the TCC judges had to interpret the normative status of 
international human rights law in the Turkish domestic order. Due to the absence of 
a qualified majority (at least 7 out of 11 judges), the case did not result in closure of 
the party. However, the Court argued:
“[T]he ‘domestic norm’ alleged to be in contradiction with Article 
11 of the European Convention on Human Rights is not a law but 
a Constitutional provision. Hence, Article 90 of the Constitution is 
not applicable in this case. Moreover, according to Article 138 of 
the Constitution, judges ‘shall give judgment in accordance with the 
Constitution, law, and their personal conviction conforming with the 
law’ and for this reason, while there are concrete Constitutional rules, 
the TCC cannot reach a verdict based on a direct application of the 
ECtHR jurisprudence through interpretation”.69
The TCC could have opened a door for a rights-based approach giving the 
ECHR and its rulings priority but missed the opportunity. Instead, the Court con-
66 The Constitutional Court (Turkey), Esas No. 2007/1, Karar No. 2009/4 (Resmi Gazete 11 
December 2009).
67 To take two examples, Article 10(2) of the Spanish Constitution (1978) states that “the 
norms relative to basic rights and liberties which are recognized by the Constitution shall be inter-
preted in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the international trea-
ties and agreements on those matters ratified by Spain”; whereas Article 16(2) of the Portuguese 
Constitution (1976) also prescribes “the provisions of the Constitution and laws relating to fun-
damental rights are to be read and interpreted in harmony with the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights”. 
68 ÖrüCü, cit. supra note 58, p. 141.
69 The Constitutional Court (Turkey), Hak ve Özgürlükler Partisi Kapatma Davası, Esas No. 
2002/1, Karar No. 2008/1 (Karar Tarihi, 29 January 2008).
60 FOCUS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN REGIONAL AND DOMESTIC SYSTEMS
tinued to support its restrictive and strict interpretation of domestic norms, notwith-
standing that it was a potential violation of Turkey’s international legal obligations. 
This is another striking example of the generally dismissive attitude of the TCC in 
which reference to international law has been made “[…] either as mere lip-service 
or in justification for the restrictions on fundamental rights and liberties”.70 
4.3. Level of Foreign Law and Precedents in the Decisions of the TCC
The TCC almost never cites foreign law or judicial decisions in other juris-
dictions. Furthermore, the present research demonstrates that actual references to 
foreign precedents appear very low in absolute terms and are declining. From 1998 
to 2012, less than 0.4% of opinions in constitutional cases cited foreign case law.71 
Although the ratio is relatively high in the dissolution of political party cases (10 
references out of 41 cases), almost all references occurred before 2006.
It is paradoxical that the TCC has only limited interaction with foreign courts 
because Turkey’s legal system was heavily imported from the French, German, 
Italian and Swiss legal systems. To borrow Slaughter’s terminology, the lack of 
horizontal communication in the TCC’s practice is very surprising. 
In understanding this, it may be useful to focus on a particular perspective, i.e. 
that of the importer.72 By choice, desire and design of the ruling elite, the entire 
Turkish legal system was created by importing from codes of foreign origin. It was 
accompanied by a series of social reform laws73 “[…] to supplement these Codes 
aimed at ‘changing the people’ – by trying to eradicating their cultures – and forg-
ing a new identity”.74 This élite dirigeante ensconced their vision in all Turkish 
State institutions without exception, including the TCC. When the legal system 
conflicted with the culture, the Turkish judges either turned a blind eye to the cul-
70 KÖKEr, cit. supra note 25, p. 338.
71 This excludes references to international law.
72 The term “importer’s perspective” was coined by Catherine Dupre in her study focusing 
on the Hungarian Constitutional Court, where she argues that “[t]his perspective considers the 
movement of law from the inside, i.e from the point of view of those who import the law of a for-
eign country and it questions the reasons for importing that law. The differences existing between 
the original model and the form it takes after its importation are not used to assess that importa-
tion in terms of good/bad or success/failure; instead, they become a starting point to reflect on 
the logic and the scope of law importation […]”. DuprE, Importing the Law in Post-Communist 
Transitions, Oxford, 2003, p. 10.
73 These social reforms were introduced under the heading of Inkilap Kanunları, which aims 
at inter alia establishing secular education (by adopting the Latin alphabet), a new legal system 
(by importing Western codes), and a new cultural identity (by introducing the mandatory use of 
hats, closing the dervish lodges and prohibiting the wearing of certain garments).
74 Emphasis added. ÖrüCü, “Judicial Navigation as Official Law Meets Culture in Turkey”, 
International Journal of Law in Context, 2008, p. 35 ff., p. 41.
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ture or attempted to accommodate it within the official framework.75 The same is 
particularly true when it comes to the TCC’s usage of foreign law. The TCC lends 
an ear to the decisions of foreign courts, albeit rarely, as long as their interpretation 
is line with the official Turkish framework. These references also remain superfi-
cial and lacking in method when the TCC refers to foreign law. As an example, the 
French Constitutional Court is referred to by the TCC in roughly 10% of its party 
closure decisions (4 cases out of 41) but these references – with identical wording 
– served as supplementary foreign legal opinions to verdicts already rendered in the 
dissolution of 4 very different Turkish political parties.76
5. CONCLuSiON
The focus on the TCC can be justified by the importance of Turkey for the 
future of the international and European liberal order at the basis of which lies the 
idea of the international rule of law. Accordingly, one would expect substantial 
involvement of the Turkish domestic courts in emerging transjudicial conversa-
tions between international and domestic judges. However, a closer analysis of the 
Turkish experience once again confirms ambiguities around the phenomenon of ju-
dicial dialogue as an element of the international rule of law. Both international and 
domestic courts, including the TCC, do cite international and foreign law. Yet, the 
increase in the practice of cross-referencing does not necessarily lead to the con-
solidation of an international rule of law. Courts engage in transjudicial dialogue in 
different ways and for different reasons. 
The TCC’s involvement in judicial dialogue relies on a practice of citing inter-
national and foreign courts. In terms of vertical dialogue, the TCC has exclusively 
engaged in dialogue with one particular court – the ECtHR. This dialogue is best 
described as a mandatory dialogue as patently evidenced by the TCC’s usage of the 
ECHR. As noted earlier, the TCC mostly cites Articles 2, 3, 6, 8, 10, 11, and 17 of 
the ECHR. Interestingly, these articles correspond to articles on the basis of which 
Turkey is frequently challenged and convicted by the ECtHR.
75 Ibid, p. 42.
76 The Constitutional Court (Turkey), Özgürlik ve Demokrasi Partisi Kapatma Davası, Esas 
No. 1993/1 Karar No. 1993/2 (Resmi Gazete 23 November 1993); the Constitutional Court 
(Turkey), Halkın Emek Partisi Kapatma Davası, Esas No.1992/1, Karar No. 1993/1 (Resmi 
Gazete 14 July 1993); the Constitutional Court (Turkey), Demokrasi Partisi Kapatma Davası, 
Esas No. 1993/3, Karar No. 1994/2 (Resmi Gazete 16 June 1994); the Constitutional Court 
(Turkey), Sosyalist Türkiye Partisi Kapatma Davası, Esas No. 1993/2, Karar No. 1993/3 (Resmi 
Gazete 30 November 1993): “In its decision on the annulment of the (French) Law granting 
special status to Corsica, the French Constitutional Court refused the notion of ‘Corsican People’ 
as a complement (mütemmim cüzî) of ‘French People’ and stressed that French People cannot be 
divided by law”.
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There is, however, a clear lack of horizontal judicial dialogue in the practice of 
the TCC, which needs some further commentary. It is noted that horizontal com-
munication among European supreme courts is common from the perspective of 
judicial dialogue. However, the TCC’s dialogue with its foreign peers is very pecu-
liar and restricted in scope. Taken together, the prevalence of vertical dialogue and 
the almost non-existence of horizontal communication in this particular case shows 
the TCC’s reluctance to engage in transjudicial conversation unless it is required to 
do so by external pressure.
The Turkish experience of judicial dialogue seems to comfort those who chal-
lenge the very substance of judicial dialogue. For its critics, judicial dialogue is 
only relevant within a limited legal and political sphere, namely the European pub-
lic order. Beyond this, judicial dialogue is not common. Evidence from Turkey 
goes further as it purports to show that even within Europe, judicial dialogue is not 
yet fully developed.
Moreover, alternative explanations may be forwarded based on the peculiarity 
of the Turkish political system and nature of the TCC. It has already been noted 
that the TCC played a key role as the guardian of the political regime in Turkey for 
decades. As such, it was vested with considerable power in the Turkish political 
system, which led the Court to become a “tutor” institution. Accordingly, the TCC 
did not need the support of any additional reference to assert its authority in the 
domestic political order. 
Finally, this paper also reveals a great need to enlarge the scope of contempo-
rary scholarship to incorporate national practices of countries that have received 
relatively little scholarly attention, such as Turkey. The posture of Turkey towards 
the international community and its norms has the potential to affect the state of 
international law in general for years to come. It is through similar experiences that 
we may be able to have more sustainable conclusions on the reality and longevity 
of phenomena such as judicial dialogue or the international rule of law.
